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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, #91-A-6604,
Petitioner,
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
Of the Civil Practice Laws and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGEMENT
RJI #16-1-2007-0509.109
INDEX # 2007-1358
ORI #NY016015J

-againstGEORGE ALEXANDER, Chairman,
New York State Board of Parole,

Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the petition of Raymond Rodriguez, verified on September 8 or 18?, 2007,
and stamped as filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on October 3, 2007. Petitioner,
who is an inmate at the Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the May, 2006,
determination denying him parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24
months. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on October 16, 2007, and has received
and reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified
on January 11, 2008, as well as respondent’s Letter Memorandum of January 11, 2008.
Additional correspondence from counsel for the respondent, dated January 11, 2008, was
received directly in chambers on January 14, 2008. The Court has also received and
reviewed petitioner’s Reply to the respondent’s Answer and Return, filed in the Franklin
County Clerk’s office on January 30, 2008.
On August 21, 1991, the petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Kings County,
as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 2½ to 5
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years upon his conviction of the crime of Attempted Robbery 2°. The petitioner was
apparently at liberty under parole supervision from a prior felony conviction at the time
he committed the crime underlying his 1991 sentence. On October 18, 1993, the petitioner
was sentenced in Supreme Court, Kings County to an indeterminate sentence of 15 years
to life upon his conviction of the crime of Attempted Murder 1°. The sentence and
commitment order specified that petitioner’s 1993 sentence was to run “concurrent with
sent. now being served.” The petitioner was at liberty under parole supervision from his
prior sentence(s) when he committed the crime underlying his 1993 conviction.
On May 2, 2006, the petitioner appeared at his initial parole release hearing after
the imposition of the 1993 sentence. Following that hearing petitioner was denied parole
and it was directed that he be held in DOCS custody for an additional 24 months. The
parole denial determination reads as follows:
“PAROLE IS DENIED. WHILE ON PAROLE YOU ROBBED
ANOTHER PERSON AT KNIFEPOINT. ON A SUBSEQUENT
OCCASION YOU ROBBED A SECOND PERSON AT KNIFEPOINT.
WHEN A TRANSIT POLICE OFFICER ATTEMPTED TO ARREST
YOU, YOU FIRED A SHOT. YOUR PRIOR 1988 PRISON TERM
FOLLOWED CONVICTION FOR AN ATTEMPTED ROBBERY
CHARGE AND ALSO INVOLVED A KNIFEPOINT ROBBERY. YOU
HAVE ADDITIONALLY SERVED MULTIPLE SENTENCES TO
LOCAL JAIL. YOU ARE A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO PUBLIC
SAFETY AND YOU ARE LIKELY TO COMMIT ADDITIONAL
CRIMINAL ACTS WHEN YOU ARE AGAIN AT LIBERTY.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal was received by the
Division of Parole Appeals Unit on September 21, 2006. The Appeals Unit, however,
failed to issue its findings and recommendation within the time prescribed in 9 NYCRR
§ 8006.4(c). This proceeding ensued.
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Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) provides, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary
release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient
performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In
making the parole release decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four
of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals and accomplishments,
academic achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates . . . [and] (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support services available
to the inmate . . .” In addition to the above, where the minimum period of imprisonment
was established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the seriousness of
the underlying offense and the inmate’s prior criminal record. See Executive Law §259i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a). Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily
deemed to be judicial functions which are not review able if done in accordance with law
(Executive Law §259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on
impropriety. See Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908,
Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d
1051. Unless the petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court
must presume that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with
statutory requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York
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State Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d
456.
The petitioner contents, inter alia, that the parole board acted in violation of
statute in that it did not have before it a copy of his sentencing minutes. Ordinarily, the
board’s failure to obtain a copy of the relevant sentencing minutes, and its resulting
inability to consider any recommendations of the sentencing judge set forth therein,
require that the underlying parole denial determination be vacated and a de novo hearing
ordered. See Carter v. Dennision, 42 AD3d 779, Lovell v. New York Division of Parole,
40 AD3d 1166 and Standley v. New York State Division of Parole, 40 AD3d 1344.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Schettino v. New York State Division of Parole, 45
AD3d 1086, the Appellate Division, Third Department deemed the parole board’s failure
to review sentencing minutes “harmless” where a copy of the minutes was attached to
the board’s answering papers and found to contain no parole recommendation.
Obviously, in order to take advantage of the Schettino exception to the general rule
requiring a parole board to have the sentencing minutes before it, a copy of the sentencing
minutes must be provided to the Court reviewing the underlying parole denial
determination.
In the case at bar the respondent acknowledges that the relevant sentencing
minutes were not before the board when the petitioner was considered for discretionary
release. In addition, the respondent has not provided the Court with a copy of such
minutes in connection with this proceeding. In his correspondence of January 11, 2008,
counsel for the respondent advised chambers that “ . . .the Franklin Correctional Facility
Parole Officer first sought Mr. Rodriguez’s sentencing minutes on September 28, 2007,
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after which Mr. Gannon [Assistant Counsel, New York State Division of Parole] sought
them by letters of November 1, 2007, December 14, 2007, and January 9, 2008. . .”
Counsel for the respondent further advised chambers that although the Division of
Parole’s requests to the Supreme Court, Kings County for sentencing minutes in other
cases are typically meet in three to five months from initial request, “ . . . there are
instances where the Division has made requests dating back [a] year and still has not
received the minutes, or even an affidavit to the effect that they are not available, from
certain courts.” This Court notes that it has not received any notification to date
indicating that a copy of petitioner’s sentencing minutes has been received by the Division
of Parole. The Court therefore finds that the May, 2006, parole denial determination
must be vacated and a de novo hearing ordered.
In the circumstances describe above, however, the Court finds that little purpose
would be served in simply directing the board to promptly obtain a copy of the relevant
sentencing minutes before conducting the de novo hearing. While the Court is satisfied
that the respondent has diligently, although perhaps belatedly 1, sought to obtain a copy
of the sentencing minutes from the Supreme Court, Kings County, it is becoming apparent
that such minutes may not be available to the board in conjunction with a prompt de novo
hearing and, in fact, may never be made available to the board. With this in mind the
Court directs that if a copy of the sentencing minutes is not available to the parole board
at the time it conducts the petitioner’s de novo parole release hearing, it shall presume

1

Criminal Procedure Law §380.70 provides , in relevant part, that “[i]n any case where a person
receives an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment, a certified copy of the stenographic
minutes of the sentencing proceeding . . . must be delivered to the person in charge of the institution to
which the defendant has been delivered within thirty days from the date such sentence was imposed . . .”
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that the sentencing judge recommended, at sentencing, that petitioner be released to
parole supervision upon completion of his minimum period of imprisonment.
Based upon all the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is granted, without costs or disbursements, but
only to the extent that the May, 2006, parole denial determination is vacated and the
board of parole is directed to conduct a de novo parole release hearing within forty-five
days of the date of this Decision and Judgement; and it is further
ADJUDGED, that if the board of parole does not have a copy of the sentencing
minutes before it at the time of the de novo hearing, it shall presume that the sentencing
judge recommended, at sentencing, that petitioner be released to parole supervision upon
completion of his minimum period of imprisonment.

Dated:

June 17, 2008, at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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